# Container Management Tool Security Control Catalog
# Conforms to Gemara #ControlCatalog (schema tag v1.2.0; see controlcatalog.cue).
# See control-catalog-guide.md for the full tutorial and this scenario.

title: Container Management Tool Security Control Catalog

metadata:
  id: SEC.SLAM.CM
  type: ControlCatalog
  gemara-version: "1.2.0"
  description: |
    Control catalog for container management tool security; mitigates threats
    from the SEC.SLAM.CM threat catalog.
  version: 1.0.0
  author:
    id: example
    name: Example
    type: Human
  mapping-references:
    - id: SEC.SLAM.CM
      title: Container Management Tool Security Threat Catalog
      version: "1.0.0"
      url: https://example.org/catalogs/SEC.SLAM.CM-threats.yaml
      description: |
        Threat catalog for the same scope; provides threat IDs referenced from each
        control's threats.
    - id: CCC
      title: Common Cloud Controls Core
      version: v2025.10
      url: https://github.com/finos/common-cloud-controls/releases
      description: |
        Foundational repository of reusable security controls, capabilities,
        and threat models maintained by FINOS.
  applicability-groups:
    - id: production
      title: Production
      description: |
        Production container workloads and clusters; controls apply to
        live environments where security posture is enforced.
    - id: all_deployments
      title: All Deployments
      description: |
        Requirements that apply whenever container images are built, pulled, or run—
        regardless of environment (dev, staging, production) or pipeline stage.
    - id: untrusted_networks
      title: Untrusted Networks
      description: |
        Applies when registry or image traffic traverses untrusted networks.
    - id: ci_cd
      title: CI/CD
      description: |
        Applies in continuous integration and deployment pipelines.

groups:
  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    title: Image Integrity and Supply Chain
    description: |
      Controls that ensure container images are authentic, unmodified,
      and from trusted sources throughout retrieval and use.

imports:
  - reference-id: CCC
    entries:
      - reference-id: CCC.Core.CTL42
        remarks: Image signing and verification

controls:
  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CTL01
    title: Use Immutable Image References by Digest
    objective: |
      Require signature validation so that only legitimate, trusted images are
      accepted; then pin each image to an immutable digest (e.g., sha256)
      after the check so that what is used matches what was verified and
      TOCTOU (time-of-check to time-of-use) attacks are prevented.
    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    assessment-requirements:
      - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CTL01.AR01
        text: |
          The system MUST verify image signature before pull or run, then pin
          the image to a digest (e.g., sha256:...) after the check and use that
          digest for all subsequent use.
        applicability: ["all_deployments"]
      - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CTL01.AR02
        text: |
          Configuration and policies MUST disallow or override use of tag-only
          references for production or sensitive workloads where supported.
        applicability: ["production"]
    threats:
      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM
        entries:
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR01
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR03
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR04
      - reference-id: CCC
        entries:
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.TH14
  - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CTL02
    title: Require TLS/SSL with Certificate Pinning
    objective: |
      Mitigate MITM Container Image Interception by protecting registry
      traffic and verifying artifact integrity: use TLS/SSL with certificate
      pinning for all registry communication, use VPNs on untrusted networks
      to reduce interception risk, and verify artifact signatures or hashes so
      that tampered or redirected content is detected even if the channel is
      compromised.
    group: SEC.SLAM.CM.FAM01
    state: Active
    assessment-requirements:
      - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CTL02.AR01
        text: |
          The system MUST use TLS/SSL for all registry communication and MUST
          pin to the expected server certificate or public key (or certificate
          chain) for the registry.
        applicability: ["all_deployments"]
        state: Active
      - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CTL02.AR02
        text: |
          On untrusted networks, the system or deployment pipeline MUST use a
          VPN or other trusted path for registry traffic, or MUST restrict
          image pulls to environments where the network is trusted.
        applicability: ["untrusted_networks", "ci_cd"]
        state: Active
      - id: SEC.SLAM.CM.CTL02.AR03
        text: |
          The system MUST verify artifact signatures or hashes (e.g. signature
          verification, digest check) before use so that tampered or redirected
          artifacts are rejected.
        applicability: ["all_deployments"]
        state: Active
    threats:
      - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM
        entries:
          - reference-id: SEC.SLAM.CM.THR02
      - reference-id: CCC
        entries:
          - reference-id: CCC.Core.TH02